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INTRODUCTION
In State v. Rogers,' the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the
year-and-a-day rule, which requires that for murder, "the victim's
death must occur within a year and a day after the fatal blow was
delivered,"2 was the law in Tennessee.' In the same opinion, the court
decided the rule was outdated, abolished it, and applied the abolition
retroactively to the defendant.4 By doing so, the Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld a conviction of murder that otherwise would have been
criminal attempt to commit murder.5  The United States Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice O'Connor, upheld the
murder conviction and held that the retroactive abolition of the year-
and-a-day rule did not violate the defendant's due process rights.6
1. 992 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1999), affd, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
2. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 7.1(e) (1986).
3. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d at 396, 400.
4. Id. at 402.
5. See State v. Rogers, No. 02C01-9611-CR-00418, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
1044, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 1997) (stating that the issue on appeal is whether
the conviction should be reduced to criminal attempt to commit murder).
6. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 466-67 (2001).
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Justice O'Connor's majority opinion undermines the notions of
legality and due process and upholds an improper use of judicial
power.
The United States Constitution states that "[n]o State shall ...
pass any ... ex post facto Law ... ."I The Supreme Court has held
numerous times that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to
legislative acts, not to judicial rulings.8 In Bouie v. City of Columbia,9
however, the Court stated, "[I]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex
Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State
Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving
precisely the same result by judicial construction."'" The Supreme
Court in Bouie recognized that a court's retroactive application of a
new law could disadvantage a defendant in much the same way as the
legislative enactment of an ex post facto law." Since it decided Bouie,
however, the Court has been loath to uphold Bouie-type due process
claims by criminal defendants to prevent them from going
unpunished. 2 By loosening the due process restrictions on judicial
construction, the Court in Rogers v. Tennessee3 further curtailed the
legal protections of criminal defendants.
Rogers is a case-study in how judges can and do undermine
legality and due process, two foundational principles of American
criminal law. Part I of this Comment will provide the factual and
procedural background of Rogers.4 Part II will discuss the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Bouie decision and its constitutional underpinnings,
and their interplay with the principle of legality.15 Part III will
critique the holding in Rogers and will demonstrate how both the
Tennessee Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
inappropriately interpreted Bouie and limited defendants' due
process rights. 6 Part IV will examine the state of the law after Rogers
and assess the effect Rogers is having on the outcome of due process
claims under Bouie.1
7
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
8. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161
(1913); see Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 362 (1964).
9. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
10. Id. at 353-54.
11. See id. at 353-55.
12. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
13. 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
14. See infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 39-98 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 99-210 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 211-70 and accompanying text.
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I. ROGERS V. TENNESSEE AND THE YEAR-AND-A-DAY RULE
A. Rogers v. Tennessee
The facts of Rogers v. Tennessee are straightforward."8 In 1994,
Wilbert K. Rogers stabbed James Bowdery in the heart with a knife. 9
During surgery, Bowdery's heart stopped beating, and the resulting
loss of oxygen to his brain caused cerebral hypoxia, leaving him in a
vegetative state.20 He remained in a coma for fifteen months until he
succumbed to a kidney infection, a common problem for comatose
patients.2
The jury convicted Rogers of second degree murder.22 He
appealed his conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Tennessee (Court of Criminal Appeals), arguing that under the
common law year-and-a-day rule, a conviction of murder requires
that the victim die within a year and a day of the assault.23 The Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the
Tennessee legislature had abolished the year-and-a-day rule when it
enacted a comprehensive statutory criminal code in 1989.24 The
Tennessee Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the
conviction on different grounds. It held that the Tennessee
legislature had not abrogated the year-and-a-day rule, and therefore
the rule was the law at the time Rogers stabbed Bowdery.26 It then
abrogated the rule itself and held Rogers guilty of murder. The court
reasoned that the rule was obsolete and that its decision to apply the
abrogation retroactively did not violate due process because it was
not "an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute."27
18. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tenn. 1999) (stating that the facts are not




22. State v. Rogers, No. 02C01-9611-CR-, 0418, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1044,
at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 1997), affd, 992 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1999), affd, 532 U.S.
451 (2001).
23. Id. (stating that the only issue on appeal is whether the common law year-and-a-
day rule applies to reduce the conviction to criminal attempt to commit murder).
24. Id. at *3. The court relied on its reasoning in State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766, 774
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), decided after the defendant committed his acts.
25. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d at 394-95.
26. Id. at 394 (holding that the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act did not abolish
the year-and-a-day rule).
27. Id. (stating that "we hereby abolish the now obsolete common law year-and-a-day
rule"). The Tennessee Supreme Court did state, however, that "the rule has never served
as the ground of decision in any Tennessee case" and that there is "uncertainty
surrounding the continuing viability of the rule." Id. at 402. These statements arguably
2002]
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction 5-4 and
held that the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive abolition of the
year-and-a-day rule did not violate due process.28
B. The Year-and-a-Day Rule
This Comment does not address whether the year-and-a-day rule
should remain a part of the law. Almost uniformly courts or
legislatures who have encountered the rule have abrogated it.29 The
Tennessee Supreme Court correctly assessed the obsolescence of the
rule.3" This Comment seeks to address the question to whom
abolition of the rule should apply.
To fully understand the decisions of the Tennessee courts and
the United States Supreme Court, a brief discussion of the year-and-
a-day rule is necessary. The Tennessee Supreme Court defined the
rule as follows: "in murder, the death must be proven to have taken
place within a year and a day from the date of the injury received."'"
Whether the rule should be classified as a substantive principle of
criminal law,32 a criminal law defense,33 or a rule of evidence,34
demonstrate that the court, rather than abrogating the rule, actually found that it was not
the law. See id. A thorough analysis of the court's opinion refutes this argument and
demonstrates that it specifically held that the year-and-a-day rule was, until Rogers, part of
the common law of Tennessee. See id. at 400-02 (stating that the court "has 'not hesitated
to abolish obsolete common-law doctrines' ") (quoting Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340,
345 (Tenn. 1991) (emphasis added)). The court's discussion of the weak foothold of the
rule in the Tennessee common law was in the context of its determination of whether
retroactively abolishing the rule was a due process violation-it engaged in this discussion
to validate its abolition, not to imply that the rule was no longer a part of the law at the
time Rogers committed his crime. Id. at 402. By finding that the rule was a weak part of
Tennessee law, the court was able to justify its decision that abrogation was not
"unexpected and indefensible." Id.; see infra notes 86, 204-06 and accompanying text.
28. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,461-63 (2001).
29. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 2, § 3.12(i) (Supp. 2002).
30. Id. (discussing how advanced medical science has rendered the rule unnecessary).
31. Percer v. State, 103 S.W. 780, 783 (Tenn. 1907) (quoting FRANCIS WHARTON,
THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 18 (3d ed. 1907)).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 18 F.3d 1166, 1172-73 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the rule is a conclusive presumption and thus a substantive rule of law and finding
that more recent commentators and many state courts have held.it to be a substantive rule
of law); State v. Moore, 199 So. 661, 663 (La. 1940) (stating that "if the death occurred
more than a year and a day from the time of the injury the person who inflicted it is not
criminally responsible for the homicide"); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 3.12(i)
(Supp. 2002) (describing the year-and-a-day rule as "an absolute rule of law"); PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 105(h) (1984) (stating that the rule is "a bar to
prosecution for homicide offenses"); Donald E. Walther, Comment, Taming A Phoenix:
The Year-and-a-Day Rule in Federal Prosecutions for Murder, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337,
1360 (1992) (examining the history of the federal year-and-a-day rule and concluding that
[Vol. 81
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however, is unclear. The ambiguity surrounding the categories
themselves further complicates classification of the rule.35 In Rogers,
the defendant argued that the rule was not a defense to murder but
rather a substantive principle of criminal law. The state conceded this
point.36 Thus, under the common law in Tennessee, the state could
not prove causation in a murder trial unless it could prove that the
victim died within a year and a day of the injury.37 In Tennessee, at
least, the rule was more than a defense-it was a bar to prosecution.38
II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The relevant law underlying the decision in Rogers v. Tennessee
is the historic principle of legality, the United States Constitution's Ex
Post Facto Clause, and the application of this clause's rationale to the
courts in Bouie through the Due Process Clause.
A. Legality
The principle of legality is a "basic premise" of criminal law.39
Generally defined, legality means that "conduct is not criminal unless
forbidden by law which gives advance warning that such conduct is
it is a rule of evidence that "is best understood as a conclusive presumption that is,
practically speaking, a rule of substantive law").
33. State v. Gabehart, 836 P.2d 102, 103 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "a majority
of jurisdictions which have considered the rule's efficacy have determined that it
constitutes a valid common-law defense to a charge of homicide"); State v. Robinson, 335
N.C. 146, 148-49, 436 S.E.2d 125, 127 (1993) (describing the rule as a "defense" that raised
"a presumption that if the death of the victim occurred more than a year and a day after
the assault, defendant's actions were not the cause of death").
34. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 13 (1999) (stating that the "rule has been described as
a rule of evidence rather than an element of the offense of murder") (citing Jones v.
Dugger, 518 So. 2d 295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
35. In Gabehart, the New Mexico court described the rule as a defense. Gabehart, 836
P.2d at 103-04. But Chase cited Gabehart for the proposition that the year-and-a-day rule
is a substantive rule of law. Chase, 18 F.3d at 1172.
36. State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 399 (Tenn. 1999), affd, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
37. Id. at 400 (stating that "[w]hile similar in some respects to a defense in the sense
that it precludes a conviction, the year-and-a-day rule is even more powerful than a
defense because it entirely precludes a murder prosecution").
38. Id.
39. LAFAVE & Sco'rr, supra note 2, § 3.1.
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criminal."4  Implicit in this principle is a prohibition against the
retroactive application of criminal laws.
Although in present day legal systems statutes define most
crimes," at common law defendants were held criminally responsible
based on the common law as applied by judges. 3 Judges create
(discover) common law crimes in two ways, based either on a
"specific precedent" or a "general doctrine."'  If a judge finds a
criminal violation based on specific precedent, he only partially
violates the doctrine of legality because, theoretically, the accused has
been given warning of the illegality of his conduct.45 A judge who
finds a violation based on general doctrines, however, completely
violates the principle of legality by depriving the defendant of
virtually any possibility of knowing his conduct is criminal.46 When
judges create new crimes based not on "specific precedent," but
instead to stop anti-social conduct, they deprive defendants of fair
40. Id.; see STANISLAW POMORSKI, AMERICAN COMMON LAW AND THE PRINCIPLE
NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE 25 (2d ed. 1975) (arguing that this principle protects the
defendant from the whims of the prosecutor). Pomorski examines the role of common law
criminal adjudication in the United States and how it undermines the principles of legality,
especially nullum crimen sine lege. POMORSKI, supra, at 1-9.
41. The principle of legality is based on "four independent, though strictly connected
rules." POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 24. The first is the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege, id., literally translated "no crime without [a] law." Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning
and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
455, 462 n.27 (2001). The second rule is the prohibition of retroactively criminalizing
conduct. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 26. Without a prohibition on retroactive laws, the
principle of legality would offer no protection. Id. The third rule is nulla poena sine lege,
meaning "no punishment without law." Id. at 28. See generally Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena
Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165 (1937) (thoroughly examining the principle of nulla poena
sine lege). This principle currently operates to prevent the imposition of a heavier penalty
than authorized by statute. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 28. The fourth rule is the
prohibition against the retroactive imposition of more severe penalties than previously
authorized. Id. at 28-29.
42. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 2.1.
43. Id. § 2.1(b).
44. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 139. A raging debate over the nature of common
law decision-making continues; that is, whether judges discover the common law that was
already there or whether they actually create new law through their decisions. See id. at
35-38. This issue was debated by Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia and is analyzed
further infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
45. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 139.
46. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 2, § 2.1(f); see POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 139-40
(stating that the application of general doctrines to penalize the accused "leave[s] ample
room for the courts to make new laws and ... to create appearances that 'old rules are
applied to new facts' "). An example of general doctrine is that anti-social behavior
should not be tolerated. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 2, § 2.1(b). Thus, a judge could
determine that an accused's behavior, though not specifically proscribed by any current
criminal statutes or existing common law precedent, was anti-social, and then create a new
common law crime to ensure that the "criminal" was punished. See id.
2002] ROGERS V. TENNESSEE 323
warning of whether such conduct is criminal.47 Of course, with the
ever increasing body of statutes and cases construing those statutes, it
is now virtually impossible for everyone truly to be on notice of
whether his conduct is criminal-"the maxim that everyone is
presumed to know the law" is, therefore, a legal fiction.48
The crucial, underlying command of legality is that judges must
fairly apply criminal statutes and must refrain from creating common
law crimes, or overturning common law defenses, based only on
general principles. Pomorski explains that when a court convicts the
accused on the basis of a common law crime, it violates nullum crimen
sine lege because there is no "underlying legislation" to support its
decision.49 He makes it clear, however, that a judge who creates a
common law crime based on precedent does not seriously violate the
broader principle of legality because the accused had notice of the
"criminal character of the punished act."5  But as Professor Hall
notes, this distinction between nullum crimen and legality is merely a
technical one." He argues that England and the United States
historically have implemented this principle in a different manner
than continental Europe, by relying on "detailed precedents" and "a
vast body of case-law."52 Thus, the difference between nullum crimen
and legality is not crucial. What is crucial is that judges violate
47. LAFAVE & ScoT-r, supra note 2, § 2.1(f). Justice Holmes explained the value of
fair notice, stating that "[a]lthough it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the
text of the law before he murders or steals.... fair warning should be given to the world in
language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain
line is passed." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). Although McBoyle
dealt with an ambiguous statute, the reasoning is just as applicable to common law
criminal adjudication. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 2.1(f).
48. LAFAVE & ScoTtr, supra note 2, § 5.1(d).
49. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 8.
50. Id.
51. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 52 (2d ed. 1960).
"The principle nullum crimen sine lege comes to the forefront; at its core is the
understanding that the legislative act is the only force determining the elements which
constitute a punishable act." POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 24. As discussed supra, the
reason that common law crimes violate this principle is that they make the law uncertain.
See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 2.1(f).
52. HALL, supra note 51, at 52. Pomorski argues that nullum crimen sine lege requires
that all crimes be codified by the legislature. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 8 (arguing that
nullum crimen is violated when a defendant is convicted based on precedent and not
statutory law). LaFave and Scott, however, seem to use the term "legality"
interchangeably with the phrase nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege. LAFAVE &
SCOTT, supra note 2, § 3.1. They argue that the principle of legality is supported by
abolishing "open-ended common law crimes." Id. Thus, under either definition of nullum
crimen sine lege, common law criminal adjudication violates the principle because it allows
the criminalization of conduct that was not previously prohibited either by statute or by
the existing common law.
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legality when they convict defendants by applying general principles
instead of specific precedents or legislation.
The codification of criminal codes and the abolition of common
law crimes help to realize the ideal of legality.53 In 1989, Tennessee
revamped its criminal code. 4 While retaining certain common law
concepts, the code is now primarily statutorily based and thus, by
design, promotes the principle of legality."
The principle of legality is only partially protected by the United
States Constitution.56 The Constitution prohibits both Congress57 and
state legislatures58 from passing ex post facto laws, but does not
prevent the imposition of common law crimes. 9 Chief Justice
Marshall long ago defined an ex post facto law as a law that "renders
an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it
53. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
54. Sections 39-1-101 to 39-6-1804 were repealed and replaced by sections 39-11-101
to 39-1.7-1703, which remain in force. Act of June 12, 1989, ch. 591, sec. 1, 1989 Tenn. Pub.
Acts 1169, 1169-1302 (codified as amended at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-101 to 39-17-
1703 (1997 & Supp. 2001)).
55. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-101(2) (1997) (stating that one of the new criminal
code's objectives is to "[g]ive fair warning of what conduct is prohibited, and guide the
exercise of official discretion in law enforcement, by defining the act and the culpable
mental state which together constitute an offense"); id. § 39-11-102(a) (1997) (stating that
"conduct does not constitute an offense unless it is defined as an offense by statute,
municipal ordinance, or rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute"); State v.
Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 399-400 (Tenn. 1999), aff'd, 532 U.S. 451 (2001). Interestingly,
the Tennessee Supreme Court quoted these statutes but ignored their underlying
principle, the principle of legality. See id.
56. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (Ex Post Facto Clause).
57. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
58. Id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
59. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 2, § 2.1(e) (discussing the authority to create
and impose common law crimes in America).
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was committed."6  This constitutional prohibition only applies to
criminal statutes.6'
B. Ex Post Facto Clause
The United States Supreme Court has held that the prohibition
of ex post facto laws only applies to the legislature, not the judiciary.62
The framers of the Constitution placed this specific prohibition in the
Constitution to protect the citizenry from the legislature.63  During
the eighteenth century, the legislature was perceived to be the chief
threat to liberty, while the common law judges were perceived to be
the guardians of liberty.64 At that time, judges were viewed as
protectors of the rule of law and not as instruments of social change.65
The clause is based upon five core principles: "fair warning" and
reliance,66 "fundamental justice, 67 the prevention of "arbitrary and
potentially vindictive legislation,' 68 "separation of powers, '69 and,
ultimately, legality.70
60. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810). In Calder v. Bull, Justice
Chase laid the foundation for ex post facto jurisprudence by listing the four types of ex post
facto laws:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the
offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (emphasis omitted). This opinion is "the
cornerstone for all subsequent judicial interpretation." H. FRANK WAY, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 15 (1980).
61. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952).
62. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161
(1913); see Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 362 (1964); supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
63. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 22-23.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 23. The role of judges at the time of the framing is hotly contested. See id.
at 35-38. This debate is one of the key differences between the positions of Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia in Rogers and is analyzed further infra notes 195-203 and
accompanying text. While writers such as Blackstone argued that judges were merely
"finding" the law, it is apparent that they could (and did) create new common law crimes.
POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 35-38 (discussing "the substantiated and crushing criticism
[of] the declaratory theory," the theory that judges were merely "finding" the law).
66. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 531 n.21 (2000) (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S.
423, 430 (1987)).
67. Id. at 531.
68. Id. at 566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29
(1981)). A legislature acts vindictively when it singles out a person or group who is
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While the Ex Post Facto Clause appears to be relatively
straightforward, the inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's Ex Post
Facto Clause jurisprudence have caused one commentator to state
that the "numerous decisions in the area have amounted to an
incoherent muddle."71  The recent case of Carmell v. Texas72
illustrates the difficulties the justices have encountered when
interpreting the clause.73  In Carmell, the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
held that the Texas Court of Appeals's application of a new rule of
evidence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, thereby reaffirming
Calder v. Bull's74 four-prong definition of an ex post facto law.
75
Carmell turned on a dispute over whether a new law enacted by
Texas governed the sufficiency of the evidence or the competency of
the witnesses. 76  The majority held that the law related to the
sufficiency of the evidence because it regulated the level of
corroboration of the victim's testimony necessary to sustain a
conviction.77 It therefore reasoned that the application of the law
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it fell within Justice
engaging in lawful activity, decides it wants to punish that group, and then enacts
retroactive legislation to criminalize its conduct. See Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws,
Bills of Attainder, and the Definition of Punishment. On Doma, the Hawaii Amendment,
and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 227, 237 (1998) (citing Cal.
Dept. of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 519-20 (1995)).
69. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 531 n.21 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.10
(1981)).
70. See HALL, supra note 51, at 58-64 (discussing the Ex Post Facto Clause's role in
upholding the principle of legality by prohibiting retroactive criminalization).
71. Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1268 (1998).
72. 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
73. A thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's Ex Post Facto Clause
jurisprudence, or even a detailed analysis of Carmell, is outside the scope of this
Comment. Carmell illustrates the Court's disagreement in this area and the effect of that
disagreement on Rogers. For a more thorough discussion of Carmell, see The Supreme
Court, 1999 Term: Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 190-99 (2000). At least one
noted scholar has supported the decision. See Laurence H. Tribe, Professor Laurence
Tribe's Response, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 537, 538 (2001) (stating that "Carmell is a rather well
argued and closely reasoned case that makes one feel proud of the Court"). But see
Jonathan D. Varat, Jonathan D. Varat's Response, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 633, 636-37 (2001)
(stating that the justices should not have "invalidat[ed] [the] perfectly sensible law[]" at
issue in Carmell); Danielle Kitson, Note, It's an Ex Post Fact: Supreme Court Misapplies
the Ex Post Facto Clause to Criminal Procedure Statutes, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
429 (2001) (arguing that the majority in Carmell was incorrect).
74. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
75. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 521-25, 552-53; Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390; see supra note
60.
76. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 547-48.
77. Id.
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Chase's fourth example of a prohibited ex post facto law," being a
"law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. '79  The
dissent reasoned that the new law merely related to witness
competency and, therefore, was not proscribed under Calder v. Bull.
80
Though the decision in Carmell concerned a statute rather than a
judicial decision, it is relevant to understanding the justices' positions
in Rogers. The 5-4 split in Carmell is the same as the split in Rogers,
except that in Rogers, Justice Souter switched sides and joined the
members of the Carmell dissent to uphold the Tennessee Supreme
Court's ruling.
C. Bouie v. City of Columbia
Recognizing that the courts could also run afoul of the principle
of legality and make decisions that are as unjust as ex post facto laws,
the Supreme Court in Bouie applied the principle of legality and the
Ex Post Facto Clause to the courts through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.81 In City of Columbia v. Bouie,82
the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trespass convictions of
Simon Bouie and Talmadge Neal, two black students who refused to
leave an Eckerd's lunch counter.83 To uphold the convictions, the
South Carolina Supreme Court had to change the meaning of the
state's trespass statute.84  The United States Supreme Court
78. Id. at 552-53.
79. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
80. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 553 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
81. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 362 (1964). Bouie was one of five sit-in
cases collectively known as the "Sit-In Cases of 1964." Recent Decisions: Sit-In Cases of
1964-A Constitutional Right to Public Accommodations?, 53 GEO. L.J. 226, 226 (1964).
82. 124 S.E.2d 332 (S.C. 1962), rev'd, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
83. Id. at 332-33.
84. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 356 ("The interpretation given the statute by the South
Carolina Supreme Court in the Mitchell case,.., so clearly at variance with the statutory
language, has not the slightest support in prior South Carolina decisions."). Section 16-386
of the South Carolina Code defined trespass as "[ejntry on lands of another after notice
prohibiting same." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-386 (Michie Supp. 1960). The Eckerd's,
however, did not post a notice stating its policy of discrimination until after the defendants
had taken their seats. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 348. But the South Carolina Supreme Court
construed the statute to prohibit remaining on property after being asked to leave. See id.
at 333 (citing City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 123 S.E.2d 512 (S.C. 1961), rev'd per curiam,
378 U.S. 551 (1964)). In Mitchell, the South Carolina Supreme Court construed the
trespass statute at issue in Bouie to require someone, even if he had legally entered the
property, to leave upon being asked by the owner. City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 123
S.E.2d 512, 516-19 (S.C. 1961), rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 551 (1964).
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overturned the petitioners' convictions, holding that the South
Carolina Supreme Court's enlargement of the trespass statute
violated the defendants' due process rights to notice and fair warning
and therefore operated exactly like an impermissible ex post facto
law. 5 The Court went on to hold that "[i]f a judicial construction of a
criminal statute is 'unexpected and indefensible by reference to the
law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,' it must
not be given retroactive effect." 6
Bouie thus used the Due Process Clause to uphold the principle
of legality.87 The Supreme Court recognized that the South Carolina
Supreme Court's strained interpretation of the trespass statute
worked as much injustice to the defendants as the South Carolina
legislature would have if it had changed the meaning of the statute
and applied the new meaning retroactively.88 The Court in Bouie did
not take issue with the South Carolina Supreme Court's
85. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 350-54, 362 ("If South Carolina had applied to this case its new
statute prohibiting the act of remaining on the premises of another after being asked to
leave, the constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws would clearly invalidate the
convictions."). The scope and meaning of the Supreme Court's holding is a source of
heated debate between the majority and the dissent in Rogers. Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, holds that Bouie's reference to the Ex Post Facto Clause is dictum and
not necessary for its decision. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459-60 (2001). Justice
Scalia, writing the primary dissent, counters that this language is part of Bouie's holding.
Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra notes 117-53 and accompanying text.
86. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354 (quoting HALL, supra note 51, at 61). The interpretation of
this language is the source of another bitter difference between O'Connor and Scalia.
O'Connor reasons that it allows the Court to change the law if the defendant has fair
warning that it will change the law. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 466-67. Scalia sharply disagrees,
asserting that Bouie does not allow judges to retroactively change the common law, but
merely to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with existing precedent. Id. at 469-70
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354. The Court couches its decision in Bouie on the
grounds of due process, not legality, because it needs a firm constitutional basis on which
to overturn the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision. See generally POMORSKI, supra
note 40, at 182-83, 191-92 (discussing the constitutionalization of the principle against
retroactive penalization by courts). The Court explicitly stated, however, that "[t]he
fundamental principle that 'the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct
in issue occurred,' must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from
courts as well as from legislatures," thus making it clear that it was thinking about legality.
See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354 (citation omitted) (citing HALL, supra note 51, at 58-59).
Contrary to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, however, the Supreme Court does not
forbid state courts from changing the plain meaning of the law through judicial
construction, but forbids the constructions being given retroactive effect. See POMORSKI,
supra note 40, at 191-92 (stating that after Bouie, courts can still use analogy to expand
punishability, but may not apply the expanded laws retroactively).
88. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354; see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF
LEGALITY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 77 (1996) (noting that "[tjhe
interpretive function of appellate courts in the United States is crucial to rule-of-law
concerns in criminal cases").
2002] ROGERS V. TENNESSEE
interpretation of the trespass statute, but with the retroactive
application of that interpretation.89  The Supreme Court also
recognized that state courts need latitude to construe state law."
Since it decided Bouie in 1964, the Supreme Court has been
extremely hostile to due process claims brought under Boule.1 In
fact, the Court last upheld a Bouie claim in a criminal case in 1977.92
Since then, it has positively cited Bouie only in civil cases 93 and
limited it in Rogers v. Tennessee.94 Often the Court bases its decision
on other grounds, either to avoid invoking Boule or because it
disagrees with the Bouie claim." In other cases, the Court appears
89. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 362 (stating that South Carolina's interpretation of the statute
could be "valid for the future" but "may not be applied retroactively").
90. See id. at 354. The Court in Bouie adopts the "unexpected and indefensible"
language from Jerome Hall's criminal law treatise. Id. at 354; see supra note 86 and
accompanying text. Professor Hall explains that, in essence, all judicial decisions operate
retroactively because it is necessary for judges to interpret existing precedents and apply
them to new facts. HALL, supra note 51, at 61. Hall recognizes the necessity of
interpretation, but argues that there must be limits on retroactive application of judicial
decisions. See id. The critical inquiry is whether a conviction is appropriate based on
existing precedent. Id. A decision that is "unavoidab[ly]," but correctly, retroactive is one
in which the court "reaches back into time and places the authoritative stamp of
criminality upon the prior conduct." Id. What is inappropriate is for the court to apply a
decision that is "unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been
expressed prior to the conduct in issue." Id.; see also ALLEN, supra note 88, at 78 (stating
that judicial interpretation of statutes is unavoidable).
91. Harold J. Krent, Should Bo'uje 1ie :Buoyed?: Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and
the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 35, 60 (1997) (concluding, in an
exhaustive article on Bouie and its impact on American jurisprudence, that "the Bouie
doctrine practically is moribund at the federal level").
92. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). The author examined all twenty-nine
Supreme Court cases that cite Bouie v. City of Columbia. See also Krent, supra note 91, at
57 (stating that Marks was the last criminal case in which a Bouie claim succeeded).
93. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring) (citing Bouie as giving the Supreme Court the authority to construe state law
to determine whether the state court's construction comports with the U.S. Constitution);
BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 & n.22 (1996) (citing Bouie for the proposition
that BMW did not have fair notice that the state would impose such a large punitive
damages award and holding that this lack of notice violated the "[e]lementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence").
94. See infra notes 99-190 and accompanying text.
95. In Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), the Court rejected the defendant's Bouie
claim that he did not have notice that his conduct was illegal. Id. at 116-17. Osborne
involved a state pornography statute that was overbroad on its face but had been
narrowed by the state court's interpretation of the statute, thus rendering it constitutional.
Id. at 113-15. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether
the defendant had been convicted based on the overly broad or the permissibly narrow
interpretation of the statute. Id. at 125-26. In the case of In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978), the Court specifically stated that it did not need to decide whether the Bouie claim
was valid. Id. at 421 n.13. In this case, the petitioner, a lawyer, was reprimanded for
improperly soliciting business. Id. at 418-21. The Supreme Court overturned the
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hostile to criminal defendants who engaged in activity that, while
perhaps not fitting precisely within the criminal statute, was
immoral.96 Thus, although the Court has never overruled Bouie, it
broadly construes the definition of fair notice97 and narrowly
construes the protections the case provides to criminal defendants.98
III. ROGERS V. TENNESSEE UNDERMINES LEGALITY AND LIMITS
BOULE
Although the Supreme Court historically has been averse to
Bouie claims, Rogers further erodes Bouie's protections.99 In Rogers,
the Supreme Court upheld the Tennessee Supreme Court's
retroactive abolition of the year-and-a-day rule."'0 Justice O'Connor
reprimand under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 439. In Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the Supreme Court held that Maine's rule allocating to the
defendant the burden of proof on whether he committed homicide in the heat-of-passion
violated the Constitution's command that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
facts necessary to support a conviction. Id. at 703-04. The Court, in this case, did not rely
on Bouie to overturn the conviction. In fact, it held that there was no Bouie violation, but
that discussion was dictum. See id. at 690 n.10. Another example of the Court using
alternative grounds to support a decision is Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973). See
infra note 155 (discussing how the Court in Douglas based its decision on a lack of
evidentiary support, not on Bouie).
96. The cases seem to indicate that the Supreme Court does not wish to use Bouie to
assist criminal defendants whose actions are reprehensible. See Krent, supra note 91, at 76
(stating that courts reject Bouie claims when the defendants' actions were clearly
immoral). In United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), the Court refused to find a
Tennessee criminal statute unconstitutionally vague. Lanier involved the conviction of a
state judge under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for criminally violating the constitutional rights of five
women by sexually assaulting them. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 261. The judge argued that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague and did not provide fair notice that his actions were
criminal. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed, but the United States Supreme Court vacated
the Court of Appeals's decision and remanded, holding that "the touchstone is whether
the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant
time that the defendant's conduct was criminal." Id. at 267; see also Krent, supra note 91,
at 57-58 (discussing Lanier). In Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam), the Court
rejected the defendant's argument that the statute in question was unconstitutionally
vague so as not to give him fair notice his conduct was illegal. Id. at 53. The defendant
violated a Tennessee statute outlawing "crime[s] against nature" by breaking into his
neighbor's home and forcing her at knifepoint to allow him to perform cunnilingus. Id. at
48. The Court distinguished Bouie as being inapplicable. Id. at 53.
97. Krent, supra note 91, at 67-72 (discussing how the courts have loosely interpreted
Bouie's foreseeability requirement to the detriment of criminal defendants); see supra note
96 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
99. For a good discussion of the implications and problems with Rogers, see The
Supreme Court, 2000 Term: Leading Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 306, 316-26 (2001)
[hereinafter 2000 Term: Leading Cases]. The article argues that "[t]he [C]ourt ...
undermined the foundational principle of legality." Id. at 317.
100. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,467 (2001).
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reasoned that because the rule was obsolete, 1 1 was not firmly
grounded in Tennessee law, 10 2 and had been abolished in nearly every
jurisdiction," 3 Bouie should not prevent the Tennessee Supreme
Court from abolishing the law.t°4 The Supreme Court characterized
the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision as "a routine exercise of
common law decisionmaking in which the court brought the law into
conformity with reason and common sense."'15 It thus held that the
retroactive abolition of a substantive rule of common law by a state
supreme court does not violate due process if the defendant had fair
notice that the court would abolish the rule. 06 By broadly construing
what constitutes fair notice'07 and refusing to follow much of Bouie's
underlying reasoning, the Court limited accuseds' due process
protections. 108
Both the majority opinion and Scalia's dissent are incorrectly
reasoned. The majority opinion is flawed in two significant ways, and
each operates to disadvantage defendants. First, the Supreme Court's
analysis of Bouie's holding is incorrect, and as a result the Court
wrongfully curtails Bouie's protections. Bouie constitutionalized the
protections of legality, and the Court should apply its holding in a
manner consistent with that purpose.0 9 Second, the Court, as
illustrated by its very reasoning in Rogers, should not have used
Rogers as the case in which it decided to curtail Bouie. Bouie and the
line of cases since Bouie deal with statutory construction, not
common law decision-making. This Comment will discuss both flaws
in the Court's reasoning. It will then analyze Scalia's dissent and
discuss how it too provides inadequate protections to the accused.
101. Id. at 462-63.
102. Id. at 464-65.
103. Id. at 462.
104. Id. at 466-67.
105. Id. at 467.
106. Id. at 466-67.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. As previously discussed, punishing prior innocent conduct or imposing harsher
penalties for criminal conduct that previously warranted lower penalties violates the
principle of legality. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text. In Rogers, the
defendant's actions were clearly illegal under Tennessee law. See State v. Rogers, No.
02C01-9611-CR-00418, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1044, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct.
17, 1997), affd, 992 S.W.2d 393, 400 (Tenn. 1999), affd, 532 U.S. 451 (2001); supra note 5
and accompanying text. When Rogers stabbed his victim, however, and the victim did not
die within a year and a day, Rogers was not guilty of murder under Tennessee law as it
existed at the time of his offense. See State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 400 (Tenn. 1999)
(holding that the 1989 revision of Tennessee's criminal code did not abolish the rule),
affd, 532 U.S. 451 (2001); supra note 27.
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A. The Court's Misinterpretation of Bouie
The Court's first error in analyzing Bouie is its misinterpretation
of Bouie's "unexpected and indefensible""' language. The Court
construed this phrase to allow a court to change the law, as long as
the revision is expected."' As Justice Scalia correctly notes, however,
this reading of Bouie is incorrect.' 2  He reiterates that Bouie
"expressed disapproval of a 'judicial construction of a criminal
statute' that is 'unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law
which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.' ""' The
majority disregards the following syllogism: The Tennessee Supreme
Court held that the year-and-a-day rule was the law of Tennessee but
then eliminated it retroactively."' In Bouie, the South Carolina
Supreme Court interpreted a trespass statute in a manner that
changed the plain meaning of that statute retroactively, and that
interpretation violated due process." 5 Retroactively eliminating the
year-and-a-day rule deprives a defendant of his due process rights in
the same way that retroactively changing the plain meaning of a
statute deprives a defendant of those rights."6  Therefore, the
Tennessee Supreme Court violated Rogers's due process rights by
retroactively abolishing the rule.
The Court then sheared away Bouie's application of ex post facto
principles to the judiciary by labeling that part of the opinion
110. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) (internal quotations omitted);
see supra notes 86, 90, and accompanying text.
111. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 467 (holding that "[flar from a marked and unpredictable
departure from prior precedent, the Tennessee court's decision was a routine exercise of
common law decisionmaking in which the court ... [laid] to rest an archaic and outdated
rule"). See generally Brief for Petitioner at 18-21, Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451
(2001) (No. 99-6218) (discussing the Tennessee Supreme Court's misapplication of Bouie).
112. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "[a]ccording to
Bouie, not just 'unexpected and indefensible' retroactive changes in the common law of
crimes are bad, but all retroactive changes").
113. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354) (emphasis added by
Scalia, J.) (internal citations omitted).
114. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d at 394-95; see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
115. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 356; see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
116. This part of the syllogism implies that Bouie, which discusses statutory
interpretation, should control Rogers, which governs common law decision-making. This
Comment later argues that Bouie is distinguishable from Rogers, but that the principles of
legality enshrined in Bouie still should apply to common law decision-making. Regardless
of whether one believes Bouie should control Rogers, because the Supreme Court decided
that it does, the Court should have interpreted Bouie correctly. In addition, while the
author concedes that the United States Supreme Court's characterization of the
Tennessee Supreme Court's abolition of the year-and-a-day rule as common law
decisionmaking is correct, he disagrees with its characterization as "routine." See Rogers,
532 U.S. at 467.
[Vol. 81
2002] ROGERS V. TENNESSEE
dictum. 7 The Rogers majority states that Bouie does not apply the
Calder ex post facto definition to the courts through the Due Process
Clause." 8 The majority holds that "[t]o the extent petitioner argues
that the Due Process Clause incorporates the specific prohibitions of
the Ex Post Facto Clause as identified in Calder, petitioner misreads
Bouie."'n9 The Court then characterizes the three passages from
Bouie to the contrary as "expansive,' 20  "suggestive,"'' and,
ultimately, dicta.'22 The categorization of this language is the source
of a bitter dispute between Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor.
Justice Scalia states that this language is not dictum, but is actually
part of Bouie's holding.'23 With its narrowing of Bouie, the Court
undermined the principle of legality 24 and created a slippery slope for
future decisions.
In characterizing this language as dictum, the majority in Rogers
made two critical errors. First, it misinterpreted why the Bouie
majority used the ex post facto language that it characterized as
dictum. Bouie used this language to explain that the clause rested on
the principle of legality, and it specifically held that the prohibition on
retroactive lawmaking "must apply to bar retroactive criminal
prohibitions emanating from courts as well as from legislatures.'
1 25
117. Id. at 459.




122. Id. at 459. The language of Bouie made three significant references to the Ex Post
Facto Clause, each of which Justice O'Connor characterized as dictum. First, O'Connor
quoted the Bouie language stating that " '[i]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post
Facto Clause from passing ... a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred
by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial
construction.' " Id. at 458 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54
(1964)). Second, she quoted the Bouie language stating that " '[a]n unforeseeable judicial
enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post
facto law.' " Id. (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964)). And
finally, she characterized as dictum the Bouie language stating that " 'It]he Due Process
Clause compels the same result' as would the constitutional proscription against ex post
facto laws 'where the State has sought to achieve precisely the same [impermissible] effect
by judicial construction of the statute.' " Id. at 458-59 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 362 (1964)).
123. Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia makes the further point that the
Bouie decision rested on the principle of legality. Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964)) (" '[Tlhe required criminal law must
have existed when the conduct in issue occurred ......") (internal quotations omitted).
This principle is partially encapsulated by the Ex Post Facto Clause. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 10, cl. 1; supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
124. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 468-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,354 (1964).
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Thus, the majority correctly concluded that Bouie did not apply the
specific Calder categories of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the
judiciary. 2 6 The majority opinion erred, however, by holding that
Bouie only rests on the concepts of "notice, foreseeability, and, in
particular, the right to fair warning." '127 Bouie rests on the principle of
legality, which includes, but is not limited to, the concepts of notice,
foreseeability, and fair warning."' At the core of legality is the idea
that retroactively changing the law to criminalize previously innocent
conduct, or retroactively increasing the penalty for criminal conduct,
is "unjust.' 1 29 It is thus more protective than the due process concepts
on which the majority in Rogers says Bouie is based. The majority in
Rogers was concerned that this "expansive" language in Bouie would
operate to prevent courts from engaging in common law decision-
making and therefore categorized it as dictum. 3 ° But Bouie did not
sweep so far as to prevent courts from interpreting the law. Its
prohibitions only extended to prohibit courts from retroactively
changing the law.
The second error, which naturally follows from the first, was to
characterize this language as dictum. 3' Properly interpreted as
clarifying that Bouie rests on the principle of legality, this language is
not dictum. An analysis of the term dictum will demonstrate that this
language is part of Bouie's holding. Black's Law Dictionary defines
obiter dictum as "[a] judicial comment made during the course of
delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the
decision in the case and therefore not precedential (though it may be
considered persuasive)."' 2 This definition, while appearing to be
simple and straightforward, is often quite difficult to apply in
126. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459.
127. Id.
128. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54; see also HALL, supra note 51, at 58-64 (discussing
the principle of legality as a core concept of criminal law whose roots are broader than
ensuring adequate notice of what conduct is criminal).
129. HALL, supra note 51, at 61.
130. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458-59, 460-62.
131. This Comment will thoroughly analyze whether this language is dictum. The
Harvard Law Review also argued, more briefly, that this language was part of Bouie's
holding. See 2000 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 99, at 321-22.
132. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999) ("Often shortened to dictum or,
less commonly, obiter."). The definition of ratio decidendi is closely related to the
definition of dictum. In fact, they are really two sides of the same coin. See POMORSKI,
supra note 40, at 43 ("The concept of dictum is closely connected with the concept of ratio.
Starting from a negative assumption it may be said that any general proposition of law
contained in the decision of the court which is not ratio is dictum."). Ratio decidendi is the
holding of a case. Id. at 39.
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practice.133 Judge Posner surveyed several reported definitions of
dictum and concluded that "the definitions [of dictum] ... are
somewhat inconsistent, somewhat vague, and somewhat circular." '134
Therefore, he observed that "instead of asking what the word
'dictum' means we can ask what reasons there are against a court's
giving weight to a passage found in a previous opinion." '35 The basic
question is whether the court "fully considered" the language in
question. 36 Judge Posner listed some of the many reasons why a
court should not give weight to language in an earlier opinion. All of
these reasons involve the question of whether the language in the
earlier opinion was "fully considered." '137 Posner adopted a four-
factor test for analyzing whether the language was dictum. If the
language was not crucial to the outcome of the case, if it could be
stripped from the court's reasoning without significantly affecting the
case's rationale, if it was not grounded in the facts, or if it was not an
issue in the case and therefore not adequately argued by the parties,
then it should not be relied upon. 38
An application of Posner's "fully considered" factors
demonstrates that Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion in
Bouie, fully considered the ex post facto passages he included in his
opinion.' First, this language is crucial to Bouie's outcome. By
applying the principle of legality to the Due Process Clause, the Court
in Bouie prohibited the South Carolina Supreme Court from
changing the meaning of its trespass statute.1 40 As discussed supra,
the concept of legality prohibits retroactively criminalizing conduct. 41
The concepts of notice, foreseeability, and fair warning, as defined in
Rogers, would alone not have been adequate to protect Talmadge
Neal and Simon Bouie from the South Carolina Supreme Court. In
Bouie, the plain meaning of the South Carolina trespass statute
indicated that the defendants were technically not trespassing.1 42 But
under Rogers's rationale that fact would not be dispositive for the
following two reasons. First, the de(2ndants also had to contend with






139. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353, 362 (1964).
140. Id. at 363.
141. See supra notes 39-61, 125-30 and accompanying text.
142. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 356; supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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the common law prohibitions against trespassing. 143  The dissent in
Bouie asserted that the common law of South Carolina prohibited the
defendants' actions.4 Further, under Rogers, even if the common
law of South Carolina did not prohibit this conduct, the defendants
should have been on notice that the South Carolina Supreme Court
could have modified the common law to prohibit this conduct if it
determined that the prior common law rule was out of date for
dealing with protesters.1 45 Second, under Rogers, the South Carolina
Supreme Court would have had more latitude in construing the
trespass statute. If other states had similar statutes and had construed
them in a similar fashion, the defendants would have been on notice
that South Carolina might have construed its statute in the same
manner.146  North Carolina had a similar trespass statute and had
construed it to prohibit the very acts Neal and Bouie committed.
47
The principle of legality is crucial to the decision in Bouie because it
provides the mechanism that prevents the South Carolina Supreme
Court from changing the law of trespass, either by modifying the
common law or by relying on precedents from other jurisdictions to
justify its construction of the state's trespass statute.
143. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that under the common law
of South Carolina, "a person who enters upon the property of another by invitation
becomes a trespasser if he refuses to leave when asked to do so"). But see id. at 357-58
(holding that civil trespass and criminal trespass were distinct at common law, such that
though someone who entered with permission could be forced to leave, his mere refusal to
leave would not subject him to criminal penalties).
144. Id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting); see supra note 143.
145. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,461 (2001) ("In the context of common law
doctrines (such as the year and a day rule), there often arises a need to clarify or even to
reevaluate prior opinions as new circumstances and fact patterns present themselves.").
One can easily imagine the public safety arguments the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Bouie could have used to "justify" such "routine... common law decisionmaking." See id.
at 467 (using the phrase "routine exercise of common law decisionmaking").
146. See id. at 463-64. The majority in Rogers held that because nearly all other
jurisdictions had abrogated the year-and-a-day rule, Rogers should have been on notice
that the Tennessee Supreme Court would abolish it. Id. This reasoning seems to conflict
with Bouie, which stated that "[iut would be a rare situation in which the meaning of a
statute of another State sufficed to afford a person "fair warning" that his own State's
statute meant something quite different from what its words said." Bouie, 378 U.S. at 359-
60. In his analysis of Bouie jurisprudence, Krent found that even before Rogers, lower
courts were using decisions from other jurisdictions to find fair notice. Krent, supra note
91, at 67. Rogers places the Supreme Court's stamp of approval on this seemingly flawed
reasoning.
147. See City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 123 S.E.2d 512, 516-17 (S.C. 1961) (South
Carolina partially relied on North Carolina's interpretation of its statute to uphold the
defendants' convictions in Mitchell, the case on which Bouie relied), rev'd per curiam, 378
U.S. 551 (1964).
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An analysis of Posner's second factor indicates that stripping the
ex post facto language from Bouie significantly affects the Court's
rationale. The opinion in Bouie, as Justice Scalia notes, is based on
the principle of legality. 148 This principle is embodied in the Ex Post
Facto Clause.'49 The Bouie Court enforced the principle of legality by
applying the principles of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the South
Carolina Supreme Court's decision via the Due Process Clause. 150
An examination of Posner's third factor demonstrates that the
language was clearly grounded in the facts. The South Carolina
Supreme Court changed the meaning of the trespass statute to convict
the defendants, and its interpretation therefore operated exactly like
a prohibited ex post facto law.'51 The correct application of the Due
Process Clause to the South Carolina legislature was clearly an issue
in Bouie, thus satisfying Posner's fourth factor.'52 Because the ex post
facto language embodied the principle of legality, it was both
necessary to Bouie's outcome and fully considered by Justice
Brennan, and is therefore not dictum.'53
The majority attempts to buttress its claim that the Bouie
language is dictum by citing other cases that it said construed Boule as
a due process case based only upon notice and foreseeability.1 4 A
closer examination of these cases, however, shows that they do not
support the majority's use of them. Two of these cases dealt with
statutes that were held void for vagueness.'55  They are
148. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; supra note 70.
150. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54. The preceding discussion of Posner's first and
second factors indicates that the two can be viewed as two sides of the same coin. The
language in question is crucial to Bouie's decision because it significantly affects Bouie's
rationale.
151. Id. at 362.
152. Id.
153. See POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 39 ("The precedent (ratio decidendi) is,
according to the 'classical theory,' only that portion of the decision which formulates a
general proposition of law, if this was the proposition employed by the court in deciding a
concrete case and if the formation of it was necessary for the decision."). Bouie meets
these criteria. The Ex Post Facto Clause language was a proposition of law. See Bouie,
378 U.S. at 353-54, 362. There was a concrete case: the South Carolina Supreme Court,
through judicial interpretation, changed the South Carolina trespass statute and applied
the change retroactively to the defendants. See id. at 362. Their convictions were upheld
based on this interpretation, and they appealed to the United States Supreme Court. See
id.
154. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,459-60 (2001).
155. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 261, 271-72 (1997) (vacating the conviction
of a state judge under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for criminally violating the constitutional rights of
five women by sexually assaulting them and remanding the case to the lower court to
determine if the statute in question was unconstitutionally vague); Rabe v. Washington,
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distinguishable from Bouie because the due process violation in Bouie
was not that the trespass statute was void for vagueness, but that the
South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of that statute
violated due process. 56 One of the cases specifically quoted the
language in Bouie that the majority in Rogers characterized as
dictum.157
The Court's citation of Rose v. Locke 5' appears, at least
superficially, to be correct.'59 The majority states that Rose upheld
the "defendant's conviction under a statute prohibiting 'crimes
against nature' because, unlike in Bouie, the defendant '[could] make
no claim that [the statute] afforded no notice that his conduct might
405 U.S. 313, 316 (1972) (holding "that a State may not criminally punish the exhibition at
a drive-in theater of a motion picture where the statute, used to support the conviction,
has not given fair notice that the location of the exhibition was a vital element of the
offense"). Oddly, Rabe does not even cite Bouie. Another case actually found a due
process violation based on a lack of evidentiary support, not a lack of fair warning.
Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973) (holding "that the finding that petitioner had
violated the conditions of his probation by failing to report 'all arrests ... without delay'
was so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to be invalid under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Thus, the discussion of Bouie in that case is dictum, so
Justice O'Connor, by her own admission, should not be relying on it. In Douglas, the
Court only discussed Bouie after resting its decision on a due process violation based on
lack of sufficient evidence. Id. at 432. The Court then went on to counter the state's
argument that the state supreme court had construed arrest to encompass the traffic
citation and that the Supreme Court should therefore defer to the state court's
interpretation of state law. Id. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the state
supreme court did not make a finding that an arrest included a traffic citation. Id. The
Court went on to state that under Bouie, if the state supreme court had made such a
finding, it would have to reject such a construction of the law as being a violation of due
process. Id. Because the Supreme Court held that the state court did not make a specific
finding that a citation constituted an arrest, its discussion of Bouie is dictum, because it is
not based on facts before the court. See id.; supra note 138 and accompanying text.
156. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 362-63; see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
157. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977) (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-
54) (stating that "an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied
retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as Art. I, § 10, of the
Constitution forbids"). The Marks opinion quoted Bouie's statement that " '[i]f a state
legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow
that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely
the same result by judicial construction.' " Id. (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54). The
Court in Marks does say, however, that there was a due process violation in Bouie because
the South Carolina Supreme Court's construction of the statute was "unexpected." Id.
But by immediately following that statement with the ex post facto quotation from Bouie,
Marks appears to state that this language is the reason why the South Carolina Supreme
Court's actions violated due process. See id. Thus, Marks significantly undermines Justice
O'Connor's holding that the Bouie language is dictum. See Brief for Petitioner at 4-5,
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001) (No. 99-6218).
158. 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam).
159. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459-60 (quoting Rose, 423 U.S. at 53).
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be within its scope.' "160 While the citation is technically a correct
statement of Rose's holding, it does not persuasively support Justice
O'Connor's statement that Bouie was grounded only on principles of
notice and foreseeability. In Rose, the defendant violated a
Tennessee statute outlawing "crime[s] against nature" by breaking
into his neighbor's home and forcing her at knifepoint to allow him to
perform cunnilingus.'6 ' The Court rejected the defendant's argument
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague so as not to give him fair
notice his conduct was illegal.'62 It held that the respondent had fair
warning his conduct was illegal because the Tennessee Supreme
Court had previously held that the statute should be interpreted
broadly and other jurisdictions construed a "crime against nature" to
include the acts that he had performed.'63 The Court decided there
was no due process violation based not on Bouie, but on other cases,
which dealt with statutes that were unconstitutionally void for
vagueness. 164 The Supreme Court distinguished Bouie, stating that
"there is no possibility of retroactive lawmaking here.' '165 Rose thus
does not support the reading of Bouie to which O'Connor ascribes it.
After failing to establish that Bouie's application of the clause to
the judiciary was dictum, Justice O'Connor reasons that applying the
Ex Post Facto Clause to the judiciary "circumvent[s] the clear
constitutional text.' 1 66  The majority opinion in Rogers again
overstates the purpose of Bouie's ex post facto language, which was
not to apply the Ex Post Facto Clause per se to the judiciary, but to
apply the principle of legality to the judiciary. Even if Bouie were
trying to apply the clause directly to the judiciary, O'Connor's
reasoning would be invalid because the Due Process Clause involves
rights fundamental to liberty.167 One of the rights fundamental to
liberty is the principle of legality embodied in the Ex Post Facto
Clause.1 68 Therefore, although the clause itself does not apply to the
courts, the underlying principle of legality does. 69
160. Id. (quoting Rose, 423 U.S. at 53).
161. Rose, 423 U.S. at 48-49; see supra note 96.
162. Rose, 432 U.S. at 52-53.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 53 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964)).
166. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001).
167. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.") (emphasis added).
168. See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (Ex Post Facto Clause); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 191 (1977) (stating that "the principle on which the [Ex Post Facto] Clause is based-
the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to
criminal penalties-is fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty"). Legality is
2002]
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The majority then makes the interesting observation that a
court's abolition of a substantive common law rule should be less
constitutionally restrained than its interpretation of a state statute.
170
The Court appears to have it backwards. Legal interpretation is
necessary, abolition of constitutional laws is not. The Court's point is
further undermined because "common law decisionmaking" will
allow the abolition of laws that protect defendants. In light of this
power, the application of ex post facto principles to the judiciary is
even more necessary than their application to the legislature. Judges,
personally affected by the gruesome facts of a particular case, are
more likely to change the law.'7' Of course, the majority's response to
this argument is that judges need the leeway to interpret, refine, and
ultimately to change the common law.1 72 While this is undoubtedly
true, the courts' ability to change the law should be restrained by the
principle of legality. To allow a court the power to engage in
retroactive common law decision-making at the expense of
protections for criminal defendants seems, on balance, to be an
improper weighing of the competing interests.173
By stripping the ex post facto language from the opinion, the
Court in Rogers holds that Bouie is based only on notice and
foreseeability, limiting it to a fair warning case.74 To make matters
an underlying principle of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 26
(stating that the prohibition of retroactive criminalization is crucial to the principle of
legality); supra notes 125-30.
169. Brief for Petitioner at 16, Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001) (No. 99-6218).
Rogers's attorney makes a strong case for this proposition. He argues that "[t]he
principles on which the Ex Post Facto Clause is based, i.e., fundamental justice, fair
warning, and the prevention of arbitrary and vindictive laws, are core concepts of
constitutional liberty." Id. Therefore, he argues that "the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prevents courts from applying judicial rulings in ways which
impinge upon these same principles. Where ex post facto laws are by their nature
fundamentally unfair when enacted by a legislature, they are likewise 'fundamentally
unfair' as the result of judicial rulings." Id. This argument is based ultimately on Bouie v.
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), which held that Bouie and Neal were "deprived of
liberty and property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
170. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 460-62.
171. Krent argues that "freeing judges from the strictures of the Ex Post Facto Clause
may invite too much judicial power." Krent, supra note 91, at 52. He ultimately
concludes, however, that restraints on retroactive lawmaking by the legislature are more
important than those on the judiciary. Id. at 93-94.
172. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461-62.
173. Of course, ultimately this conclusion is the opinion of the author.
174. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459. The Court fails to recognize that the reasons underlying
legality are broader than just fair notice. See HALL, supra note 51, at 63 (arguing that the
principle of legality necessarily goes beyond a requirement of fair warning); Krent, supra
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worse for criminal defendants, Rogers endorses an expansive
definition of fair warning. The requirement of fair warning has
always been easy to meet when rejecting Bouie claims,'75 and after
Rogers it is much easier for two reasons. First, Rogers permits courts
to change the law retroactively, even if the change is unexpected, as
long as it is not indefensible.'76 Justice Scalia asserts that under Bouie
the Court could not change the law at all, prospectively or
retrospectively.'77  Rogers allows courts to change the law
retroactively, unless the defendant does not have "fair warning" that
the court will change it.'78 This reading of Bouie gives courts much
more discretion to find fair notice because now they can find fair
notice not only when they think the defendant should have known a
court would interpret a law in a certain way, but also when he should
have known that the court would change the law. Thus, the
defendant is held to a much higher standard under Rogers than under
Bouie; he must be able to anticipate what the law is and also what the
court might change it to be.'79 Ultimately, under Rogers, a court is
bound by a lower due process standard, because it can change the law
if it believes that the defendant had fair notice of the change. 8 °
The second reason that it is easier to find fair notice under
Rogers is that the Supreme Court has made it clear that the actions of
other jurisdictions can provide fair warning to defendants. 8' The
majority holds that the abolition of the rule by most jurisdictions
helped provide Rogers fair notice that the Tennessee Supreme Court
note 91, at 46 n.49 (discussing how the principle of legality guards against vindictive
governmental action).
175. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
176. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[t]he Court
attempts to cabin Bouie by reading it to prohibit only unexpected and indefensible judicial
law revision, and to permit retroactive judicial changes so long as the defendant had fair
warning that the changes might occur") (citing Rogers, 532 U.S. at 462) (internal
quotations omitted). The term "indefensible" is not defined in Bouie or in Rogers. As
discussed supra notes 86 and 90, however, the Court in Bouie adopted this language from
Professor Hall's treatise. In the paragraph following his use of the term "indefensible,"
Professor Hall argued that punishing a defendant more severely than the law allowed
when the defendant committed the crime is "unjust." HALL, supra note 51, at 61. As
discussed supra, that is what occurred in Rogers. Hall would tolerate retroactive decisions
that were "unavoidable"-that is, those that involved necessary statutory construction.
Id.; see supra note 90. It does not seem that he, nor the Court in Bouie that adopted his
language, would tolerate a retroactive abolition of a substantive rule of criminal law.
177. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 466-67.
179. See id. at 479-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 463-64 (discussing the relevancy of other states' abolition of the rule to
the issue of Rogers's constructive knowledge); supra note 146.
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would abolish it. 182  Justice Scalia persuasively counters that the
actions of courts in other states are irrelevant to fair notice.183 He also
notes that even if the decisions of other states are relevant, most
other states confronting this issue did not abolish the rule
retroactively.'84 In fact, the Court in Bouie addressed the impact of
other states' laws on fair notice and concluded that in nearly all
situations, the laws of other states would be irrelevant.'85
B. The Court's Misapplication of Bouie
This Comment argues that the principle of Bouie, the
constitutionalization of legality and its application to the judiciary,
should be extended to common law decision-making. A judge can
equally disadvantage a criminal defendant by overturning a common
law rule or broadly construing a statute to prohibit conduct. The
majority in Rogers, however, correctly notes that common law
decision-making is different from statutory construction.' 6  It
therefore limits Bouie to preserve judges' ability to construe the
common law.'87 Limiting Bouie is incorrect for two reasons. First, the
majority's interpretation of Bouie, as discussed earlier, is
inaccurate.'88 But perhaps just as problematic is that the majority's
interpretation of Bouie is unnecessary to its decision.'89 Bouie, and
the cases that follow Bouie, deal with statutory construction, not
common law adjudication. To affirm the Tennessee Supreme Court's
holding, the majority did not even need to interpret Bouie. It could
have merely distinguished it as a statutory construction case and held
it to be inapplicable. Having distinguished Bouie, the majority could
have rested its holding on traditional due process notions of notice
182. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 463-64.
183. Id. at 479-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Requiring citizens to apprise themselves of
the statutory and common law of a state, as well as a court's propensity to change the law,
would appear to be too much. To then add a requirement that they also become familiar
with other states' laws would seem to violate Justice Holmes's mandate in McBoyle v.
United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). See supra note 47.
184. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 479 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1964). The Court specifically
stated that "it would be a rare situation in which the meaning of a statute of another State
sufficed to afford a person 'fair warning' that his own State's statute meant something
quite different from what its words said." Id.
186. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461-62.
187. See id. at 466-67.
188. See supra notes 110-85 and accompanying text.
189. See 2000 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 99, at 321 (stating that "[t]his
reinterpretation of Bouie was neither necessary to protect the process of common law
adjudication, nor essential to respect the differing institutional roles played by courts and
legislatures").
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and foreseeability. By reinterpreting Bouie to ensure it would not
conflict with the Courts' power to modify the common law, the Court
cured the disease by killing the patient. Rogers is a case about
common law decision-making, not statutory construction. But in
deciding this case, the Court curtailed not only protections from
retroactive common law decision-making, but also retroactive
statutory construction, even though the case does not implicate the
latter concern. Why the Court was motivated to write such a broad
opinion on such a narrow set of facts is unclear. This action could
represent a lack of careful reasoning or a conscious effort to limit a
disfavored doctrine. 190  In either event, the Court's reasoning is
overbroad and unduly limits defendants' due process protections.
C. Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion more accurately discusses
Bouie and shows how the majority's opinion does not withstand
scrutiny. Justice Scalia correctly points out that the majority
misinterpreted Bouie,'9' that the Tennessee Supreme Court
retroactively changed the law, violating due process and the principle
of legality, 92 and that even if legality is irrelevant, the defendant had
no fair warning that the Court would abolish the year-and-a-day
rule. 193 His opinion, however, does not provide adequate support for
the principle of legality. His analysis, like the majority's, retains
powers for judges in opposition to the principle nulla poena sine lege
("no punishment without law") that he cited approvingly in his
dissenting opinion.194 Justice Scalia's deference to the declaratory
theory of common law decision-making motivates this retention of
power. 95  Though the declaratory theory has been "fiercely
criticized,"' 96 some American and English judges still adhere to this
view of judicial decision-making. 97  The declaratory theory is
problematic because it is merely a fiction that allows judges to avoid
190. On the other hand, the Court's extension of Bouie to Rogers does mean that
Bouie's fair notice standard now explicitly constrains common law decision-making.
Perhaps the majority wanted to extend the doctrine to common law decision-making in
general, albeit in a less potent form, but did not want to let Rogers go free to do it.
191. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 469-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 477-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 472-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 37.
197. Id.
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responsibility for their actions.'98 Instead of acknowledging that they
are making law, they claim they are discovering the law. 99 Thus, they
can retroactively apply new law without really appearing to do so.
200
Justice Scalia states that he would allow a court to retroactively
overturn prior precedent if it concluded the precedent was incorrect
so long as the decision satisfied Bouie's "fair notice" requirement.2 1
The problems with Scalia's reasoning are derived from his adherence
to the declaratory theory of the law. Whether a court was previously
mistaken is irrelevant to fair notice and, more importantly, legality.
A defendant can rely only on the law as declared, or, more accurately,
made, by earlier decisions. A mistaken court's decision is still
precedent.2  Allowing courts to retroactively change the law because
they were "mistaken" stands in sharp contrast to the principle of
legality because a court could in effect criminalize conduct that it had
previously found to be innocent. 3
Scalia's critique of the majority opinion is also problematic.
Scalia reasons that the majority improperly construed Tennessee law
to reach its decision, stating that the Tennessee Supreme Court's
decision that the year-and-a-day rule was the law in Tennessee is
198. Id. at 38 (noting that judges adhere to the declaratory theory "to evade the
responsibility for the content of the law they make"); see Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV.
647, 660 (1999) (stating that "the classic declaratory theory left ample room for departing
from precedent under the fiction that prior decisions were not law in and of themselves
but were merely evidence of it"). No less an authority than Justice Holmes has criticized
the declaratory theory of law. Thomas R. Lee & Lance Lehnhoff, The Anastasoff Case
and the Judicial Power to "Unpublish" Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 155 n.96
(2001) (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
Holmes stated that "[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the
articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified." S. Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Albert Kocourek,
Retrospective Decisions and Stare Decisis and a Proposal, 17 A.B.A. J. 180, 180-81 (1931)
(stating that "it is universally conceded that the Declaratory theory is not only a fiction but
also that it is a fiction which when taken seriously often produces bad results").
199. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 38 ("A new precedent, according to the declaratory
theory, does not really make a new law but only 'discovers,' 'declares,' and 'authenticates'
the existing law, hence the question of retroactivity of the new laws made by the courts
does not arise."); see supra note 198 and accompanying text.
200. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 38; see supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
201. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,481 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 36 (stating that beginning in the nineteenth century,
precedent became the basis of the common law, replacing the "customary law of the
court").
203. Id. at 26-27 (stating that without a prohibition on retroactivity, "a person
committing an act not prohibited by law could never be sure that in the future he or she
would not be held responsible on grounds of a retroactive law").
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binding on the United States Supreme Court.204 This reasoning has
much superficial appeal and seems to favor the correct outcome in
this case. While O'Connor does engage in an analysis of how "firmly
entrenched" the year-and-a-day rule was in Tennessee common law,
she engaged in this analysis primarily in the context of determining
whether there was a due process violation. 2°5 The justices in Bouie
had to independently construe the South Carolina trespass statute
and the state courts' prior constructions of that statute to determine if
the South Carolina Supreme Court's construction of the statute
violated due process.2 °6 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court
had to construe the Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling in Rogers and
the Tennessee courts' earlier constructions of the year-and-a-day rule
independently to determine whether the Tennessee Supreme Court
abolished the rule.
The following question illustrates the necessity of allowing the
Court to construe state law: "What if the Tennessee Supreme Court
concluded that the year-and-a-day rule had never been the law in
Tennessee, and just decided that the prior opinions, being dicta,
misstated the rule?" Would Rogers then have any recourse? Under
Scalia's reasoning, he would not, for two reasons. First, Scalia would
allow a court to retroactively overrule prior decisions that it
determined "misstated" the law.207 Second, because Scalia would
strip the Supreme Court of the power to independently review the
state supreme court's holding regarding the validity of a common law
rule, the Court would be prevented from determining if the state
court's abolition or modification of that rule violated due process.2 8
There would be no way to determine if abolition or modification truly
occurred, unless the state court admitted that it did. The unstated
theme of Scalia's reasoning, however, is correct. The United States
204. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 468-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205. See id. at 464-66.
206. In Bouie, the Court held that "[tihe interpretation given the statute by the South
Carolina Supreme Court ... has not the slightest support in prior South Carolina
decisions." It therefore found that the South Carolina Supreme Court violated the
defendants' due process rights. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 356 (1964).
207. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 481 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra notes 201-03 and
accompanying text.
208. The "[Supreme] Court, however, repeatedly has held that state courts are the
ultimate expositors of state law." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975). The
Court stated that it would rarely engage in an independent analysis of state law, and would
only do so when the state court's construction of the law "appears to be an 'obvious
subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue.' " Id. at 691 n.11. The Mullaney
Court concedes that in certain situations a federal court would need to second-guess a
state court in order to decide a Bouie claim. Id. at 690 n.10.
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Supreme Court should not be in the business of construing state law.
But if the Court just adhered to its reasoning in Bouie, the problem
would be adequately addressed."9
In Rogers, however, the majority erred in its analysis of the year-
and-a-day rule's presence in Tennessee law by ultimately concluding
that it was not so firmly rooted in Tennessee common law that its
abolition would violate due process.21° This holding was mistaken, as
all of the Tennessee cases supported the rule. The problem, which
Justice Scalia realizes (but does not solve), is that when the Supreme
Court decides to construe state law, it can make incorrect decisions.
But if it does not construe state law, at least in certain instances, it will
leave defendants with no recourse from state justices who violate due
process.
IV. THE IMPACT OF ROGERS
Rogers is already making an impact on American jurisprudence.
As of September 2002, thirty-three cases had cited Rogers v.
Tennessee. These cases indicate that, in general, Rogers will not
significantly change Bouie due process jurisprudence, as courts
routinely denied Bouie claims before the decision in Rogers.2 '
Interestingly, although Rogers stripped the Ex Post Facto Clause
language from Bouie, it has often been cited as applying ex post facto
principles to the judiciary. Several courts have quoted approvingly
Justice O'Connor's statement "that limitations on ex post facto
judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process. "212
Thus, it appears that neither Justice O'Connor's desired wholesale
rejection of Bouie's ex post facto language nor the petitioners' desired
209. At least one commentator disagrees with this assertion. Professor Massey argues
that the Supreme Court's analysis of Tennessee law "was not the best" way to determine if
the Tennessee Supreme Court violated due process. Calvin Massey, Federalism and the
Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 515 (2002). He argues that by accepting the
Tennessee Supreme Court's analysis of its own law, the Court would have better protected
the principles of federalism. Id. In his view, the Court then could have determined if the
decision comported with due process. Id. As this Comment has argued, it would seem
difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision
was constitutional without conducting an independent analysis of the prior law.
210. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 466 (holding that the Tennessee Supreme Court's abrogation
of the year-and-a-day rule did not violate due process); see supra notes 106-08 and
accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
212. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 456; see Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1228 (10th Cir.
2002); Carter v. Gibson, 27 Fed. Appx. 934, 944 (10th Cir. 2001); Neal v. Kaylo, 2001 WL
1195879, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 10, 2001); Galloway v. State, 781 A.2d 851, 890 (Md. Ct.
App. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1547 (2002).
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wholesale incorporation of the Ex Post Facto Clause will occur.213 At
least one court has cited Rogers (correctly) as holding that the Due
Process Clause does not incorporate the Calder categories to the
judiciary wholesale. 14
Most cases have been decided under Rogers just like they would
have been decided under Bouie-i.e., Bouie claims have been
rejected. Bouie's "unexpected and indefensible" language has always
made it difficult for defendants to prevail on Bouie claims. In the
following cases, the courts used Rogers merely as a modern citation of
Bouie rather than a case that changed Bouie. In State v. Garcia,215 an
inmate in a youth detention facility was convicted of custodial
assault.216  He argued self-defense.217  Washington had two self-
defense standards, a general rule and an "arrest rule. '218 In State v.
Bradley, decided after Garcia's acts, the court applied the arrest rule
to persons already in custody,219 and Garcia argued that the
application of Bradley to him violated his due process rights against
retroactive judicial decision-making. 22°  The court rejected this
claim.22' In this case, the petitioner had a strong argument that the
Washington Court of Appeals engaged in retroactive judicial
decision-making because it either abolished the common law defense
of self-defense, or interpreted it in an unforeseeable manner by
significantly limiting the self-defense doctrine.222 The Washington
213. In addition, some courts, either erroneously believing that Rogers is a case
applying the Ex Post Facto Clause, and not the Due Process Clause, or more likely just
needing a recent case to cite that discusses the Ex Post Facto Clause, have cited Rogers.
See Griggs v. Maryland, 263 F.3d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1093
(2002); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166 (2002); Neal, 2001 WL 1195879, at *7; State v.
Smith, 00-1935, p.3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/01), 794 So.2d 41, 42-43.
214. Janecka v. Cockrell, No. 01-21013, 2002 WL 1767185, at *6 n.11 (5th Cir. Aug. 1,
2002).
215. 27 P.3d 1225 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
216. Id. at 1226.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1227. "The general rule allows the use of reasonable force in self defense by
a person who reasonably believes he or she is about to be injured." Id. "The 'arrest rule'
allows the use of reasonable force to resist arrest, whether lawful or unlawful, only if the
'arrestee is actually about to be seriously injured or killed.' " Id. (quoting State v. Bradley,
10 P.3d 358, 361 (Wash. 2000)).
219. State v. Bradley, 10 P.3d 358, 364 (Wash. 2000).
220. Garcia, 27 P.3d at 1227.
221. Id. (holding that it was not unforeseeable "[tihat our Supreme Court would adopt
the 'arrest rule' in analyzing a self defense claim against correctional officers ... , and it
was not 'unexpected and indefensible' to extend the 'arrest rule' to defendants who, while
not under arrest, are incarcerated by the State").
222. See id.
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Court of Appeals, like the United States Supreme Court, applied
Bouie's "unexpected and indefensible" language to permit a change
in the law, not just an interpretation of existing law.223 Rogers again
does not appear to affect the court's analysis of the defendant's Bouie
claim.2
24
Two BouielRogers cases were inadvertently decided correctly,
though they did not correctly analyze Bouie or Rogers.25  Each
involved statutes whose plain meanings applied to the defendants'
conduct, but the courts went through a flawed legal analysis to reject
the defendants' claims. In State v. Goebel ("Goebel H"),226 the
defendant argued that the court violated Bouie by construing a law in
an indefensible manner.227 The law required a probable cause hearing
within thirty-six hours for probationers who were arrested pursuant
to a court-issued warrant.22' The court in State v. Goebel ("Goebel
I"),229 held that the probable cause requirement only applied to court-
issued warrants.23° The court in Goebel II rejected the defendant's
arguments that its earlier construction was unexpected and
indefensible and therefore violated his due process rights.23 1 Because
the court's interpretation adhered to the plain meaning of the statute,
the justices reached the correct decisions on both the meaning of the
statute and the retroactive application of the statute's construction.232
223. See id.
224. See id. The court, however, could have better used Rogers to justify its position.
Rogers actually gives it the authority to abolish common law defenses to bring them in line
"with reason and common sense." Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 467 (2001). No
strong argument that the general self-defense rule should not apply to inmates exists, so
Rogers would apply to permit this conduct, although Bouie should not.
225. See Morgan v. Robinson, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2001); State v.
Goebel (Goebel I1), 2001 MT 155, 1 20-30, 31 P.3d 340, 346-47 (Mont. 2001).
226. 2001 MT 155, 31 P.3d 340 (Mont. 2001).
227. Id. 14-19, 31 P.3d at 344-45. Goebel II decided whether the construction of the
statute in State v. Goebel (Goebel 1), 2001 MT 73, 31 P.3d 335 (Mont. 2001) and a
companion case should be applied retroactively. Goebel II, 2001 MT 1-4, 31 P.3d at
341-42.
228. Goebel 1, 2001 MT T 12, 31 P.3d at 336-37 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-1012
(2001)).
229. 2001 MT 73, 31 P.3d 335 (Mont. 2001).
230. Id. [ 19-22, 31 P. 3d at 338-39. The court remarked that the statute was illogical
because a probable cause hearing for a court-issued warrant is unnecessary, since the
warrant itself must be based on probable cause. Id. 22, 31 P.3d at 339. The court
reasoned that the legislature had made a drafting error in the statute and actually meant to
apply the probable cause hearing requirement to warrantless arrests by parole and
probation officers. Id. 23, 31 P.3d at 339.
231. Goebel II, 2001 MT 22, 31 P.3d at 344-45 (concluding that based on the plain
meaning of the statute, its construction was not "unexpected and indefensible").
232. See id.; Goebel 1, 2001 MT 13-24, 31 P.3d at 338-39.
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Some of the court's discussion of Bouie and Rogers, however, is
flawed. First, the court cited as precedent the passages from Bouie
that Rogers characterized as dicta, thus indicating the justices' failure
to closely read Rogers.2 33  The court also interpreted Bouie's
"unexpected and indefensible" language incorrectly.234 It held that its
construction of the statute could not be unexpected and indefensible
because it had never construed the statute before. 235  Although
construing a statute to mean one thing when a consistent line of cases
held it to be another would be a due process violation,236 construing a
statute in a manner that is completely at variance with the statutory
language could also be a due process violation under Bouie. 237 Even
under Rogers, a construction of a statute dramatically different from
the statute's plain meaning could violate a defendant's interest in fair
notice.238
233. Goebel If, 2001 MT 1 24-27, 31 P.3d at 345. Of course, dictum is often persuasive.
The decision in Rogers, however, indicates that the Bouie language it characterized as
dictum should not be cited as persuasive authority. The opinion in Rogers called this
language "expansive" and held that Bouie rested firmly on "notice, foreseeability, and...
fair warning." Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 458-59 (2001); see supra notes 117-24
and accompanying text. Thus, Rogers seems to completely write this language out of
Bouie's reasoning.
234. Goebel II, 2001 MT $ 19-22, 31 P.3d at 345.
235. Id. $ 22, 31 P.3d at 345.
236. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 356 (1964) (holding that "[t]he
interpretation given the statute by the South Carolina Supreme Court ... , so clearly at
variance with the statutory language, has not the slightest support in prior South Carolina
decisions"). Bouie also stated that "[w]hen a state court overrules a consistent line of
procedural decisions with the retroactive effect of denying a litigant a hearing in a pending
case, it thereby deprives him of due process of law 'in its primary sense of an opportunity
to be heard and to defend [his] substantive right.' " Id. at 354 (quoting Brinkerhoff-Faris
Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930)).
237. See id. (quoting HALL, supra note 51, at 58-59) (holding that "[i]f a judicial
construction of a criminal statute is 'unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law
which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,' it must not be given retroactive
effect"). Although Bouie discusses the overruling of a line of cases as being indefensible,
it does not limit "law" to case law. Thus, if a statute had never been interpreted before, it
would be the law, and the court would have a duty to interpret it in a foreseeable and
defensible manner. This author concedes, however, that the court's decision, in light of
the hostility to Bouie and its progeny, is itself not unexpected.
238. In Rogers, the Court stated:
Our decision in Bouie was rooted firmly in well established notions of due
process .... Its rationale rested on core due process concepts of notice,
foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear
on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had
been innocent conduct.
Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459.
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Morgan v. Robinson... is an example of another analytically
flawed case that resulted in a correct outcome. The defendant was
convicted of "soliciting lewd and lascivious conduct with a fourteen-
year-old.""24  He argued that the California Court of Appeals
improperly construed state law and convicted him of an offense that
was not present under existing law because the statutory scheme did
not proscribe soliciting lewd and lascivious conduct with a fourteen-
year-old, but only with someone under fourteen.2 41 The district court
found that the plain language of the statute prohibited the conduct in
question.242
While this determination appears correct based on the plain
language of the statute, the court made stray statements that are
dangerous to the principle of legality. The court appears to hold that
even if the statute did not prohibit the conduct, it would construe it in
such a manner as to effect what it perceived to be the intent of the
legislature.2 43 This type of reasoning is a violation of Bouie, because it
allows the creation of crimes by analogy.244 The court did not even
cite Rogers or Bouie as constricting a state supreme court's ability to
construe a statute in this manner.2 4  Application of Bouie to this
situation would be especially appropriate because it specifically dealt
with retroactive statutory construction.246 The court cited Bouie, as
interpreted by Rogers, as just a fair warning case 247 and merely cited
Rogers as a case that reaffirms Bouie.248 The court's analysis of Bouie,
and thus of Rogers, is erroneous.249 It cited Bouie/Rogers for the
239. 156 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
240. Id. at 1137.
241. Id. at 1141.
242. Id. at 1142. For the purposes of this analysis, a complete discussion of the
complex statutory scheme under which Morgan was convicted is not necessary.
243. Id. at 1142 ("Despite any perceived inconsistencies in the statutory scheme
governing sex offenses, one thing is evident: The Legislature clearly intended to broaden
the reach of that scheme by enacting [P.C.] section 653f(c). Criminalizing the solicitation
of lewd conduct with a 14 year old is entirely consistent with this intent.").
244. See POMORSKI, supra note 40, at 192 (stating that after Bouie, courts can still use
analogy to expand punishability, but may not apply the expanded laws retroactively);
supra note 87 and accompanying text.
245. The court holds that unless the state supreme court's construction of a state
statute is "untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional
violation," it is valid. Morgan, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (internal quotations omitted).
While the court should defer to a state court's construction of its own law, it seems
difficult to determine whether that construction violates due process without engaging in a
BouielRogers analysis.
246. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964).





proposition that so long as the conduct in question could reasonably
be expected to be criminal, there is no violation of Bouie's fair
warning requirement.25 ° While Rogers has cabined Bouie as a fair
warning case, Bouie's protections are still broader than this court's
opinion suggests. Just because conduct is reprehensible, and likely
should be criminal, does not mean that defendants should be on fair
notice that it actually is criminal-there must be an underlying law
criminalizing the conduct.
The cases discussed above appear to show that Rogers has had
little effect on Bouie jurisprudence. Courts either cite Rogers as
merely upholding Bouie, without looking at what effect Rogers really
had on the opinion, or just misinterpret Bouie altogether. A different
picture emerges when reviewing a case that analyzed Rogers
correctly. State v. Redmond"' applied the full meaning of Rogers, and
the result illustrates why neither Justice O'Connor's nor Justice
Scalia's opinions in Rogers are sufficient to protect individuals from
retroactive judicial lawmaking.252  In Redmond, the defendant was
convicted of second degree murder. He appealed, arguing that the
retroactive application of State v. Burlison,253 which eliminated the
element of malice from the definition of murder, violated his due
process rights.25 4 The Nebraska Supreme Court, relying on Rogers's
interpretation of Bouie, held that the retroactive application of
Burlison did not violate due process. 5 First, it discussed how
Rogers's interpretation of Bouie did not apply the Ex Post Facto
Clause to the judiciary.5 6 Freed from the constraints of the principle
of legality, the court engaged in a due process foreseeability analysis
to determine if retroactive application of Burlison was "unexpected
and indefensible" and found that it was not.257
250. Id. at 1144.
251. 631 N.W.2d 501 (Neb. 2001), cert. denie,', 534 U.S. 1033 (2001).
252. See 2000 Term: Leading Cases, sup:a note 99, at 325 n.83. In Redmond, the
parties specifically filed additional briefs to argue the impact of the Supreme Court's
decision in Rogers to the case. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d at 505.
253. 583 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1998).
254. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d at 503. In Burlison, the Nebraska Supreme Court
overruled nearly twenty years of precedent that stated that even after the statutory
revision of the homicide statute, malice was still an element of second degree murder.
Burlison, 583 N.W.2d at 36. The court reasoned that its decisions adding the element of
malice to the statute "were clearly erroneous and therefore should be overruled." Id.
Interestingly, the court did not even address the due process implications of retroactively
overturning its precedent.
255. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d at 506-09.
256. Id. at 507-08.
257. Id.
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The court's decision, especially in light of Rogers, is not
surprising, and it might even be a correct application of the law.258
But the decision illustrates the flaws in Rogers. Because Rogers
stopped constraining Bouie's "unexpected and indefensible" test with
the principle of legality as embodied in the Ex Post Facto Clause,
courts have more leeway to retroactively construe statutes to the
detriment of defendants.259 In Redmond, the court retroactively
abolished an element of a crime,26° which is abhorrent to legality.26
The court also held that its decision was not unexpected because its
prior cases had been in disagreement.262
By removing the principle of legality from the Due Process
Clause, Rogers has further legitimized retroactive judicial decision-
making. Another disturbing aspect of this case is that Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion would probably not have protected the defendant
in Redmond. In Rogers, Justice Scalia stated that "[a] court would
remain free ... to conclude that a prior decision or series of decisions
establishing a particular element of a crime was in error, and to apply
that conclusion retroactively (so long as the 'fair notice' requirement
of Bouie is satisfied)." '263 In Redmond, the court did exactly what
Justice Scalia would allow it to do-it overruled a line of cases that it
determined was incorrect in finding malice to be an element of
258. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459-60 (2001); Redmond, 631 N.W.2d at
506-09. The Redmond court, reversing prior precedent, held that because the plain
language of the statute did not include malice, a decision that eliminated the malice
requirement was not "unexpected and indefensible." Redmond, 631 N.W.2d at 508.
259. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458-60.
260. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d at 508-09.
261. The court's analysis is unpersuasive. It stated that "[i]ndefensible is defined as
'incapable of being maintained as right or valid' or 'incapable of being justified or
excused.'" Id. at 508 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
UNABRIDGED 1147 (1993)). It went on to say that "in a case such as Bouie, where a court
interprets a statute in a surprising manner that has little in the way of legal support, the
interpretation could not be applied retroactively. Our decision in Burlison was not such a
case." Id. But it was. There was no support for this construction of the state homicide
statute because the Nebraska Supreme Court conceded that it had consistently held that
malice was an element of murder. It seems highly unfair that a court can at once require a
defendant to apprise himself of how a court interprets a statute, even if that interpretation
would not be readily apparent to someone reading the statute, and to also require that
same defendant to be able to predict when the court will have to overrule itself because
the plain language of the statute demands another interpretation.
262. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d at 508-09. But the court's citations of these cases show
that the cases themselves were not in disagreement, just some of the justices. Id. at 506
(citing a case with a dissenting opinion as evidence of a "disagreement"). Apparently,
defendants will also need to be able to predict the precedential value of dissenting
opinions, because under Redmond, they give the courts a reason to retroactively abolish
the law.
263. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 481 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
ROGERS V. TENNESSEE
second degree murder.2 4 Although Justice Scalia says that the court's
decision would have to satisfy Bouie's fair notice. requirement, that
has not proven to be much of a hurdle for courts to overcome. 65
Redmond, however, is distinguishable from Rogers in significant
ways that the Nebraska Court failed to adequately address. First, the
Nebraska Court did not engage in "a routine exercise of common law
decisionmaking," but instead engaged in statutory construction.266
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Rogers relied heavily on the necessity
of courts retaining control over the development of the common
law.267 That is not an issue in Redmond. Second, in Rogers, part of
the dispute was whether the year-and-a-day rule was a substantive
rule of law, a defense, a rule of evidence, or just a rule involving
causation. 268  At oral argument this point was contested, and it is
conceivable that certain justices might find that judicial abolition of
an element of a crime violates due process.2 69 Third, the requirement
of malice for second degree murder is not an outdated relic of the
common law. Although the Nebraska criminal code now uses more
precise language, the malice requirement can still be justified on the
bases of "reason and common sense. 2 0  The year-and-a-day rule,
however, is indisputably out-of-date, which provided the Supreme
Court with further justification for allowing it to be overturned.
Thus, neither the majority opinion nor Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Rogers is satisfactory because each violates the principle of
legality in the contexts of both common law decision-making and
statutory construction. In the common law context, the majority
opinion violates the principle of legality by allowing the retroactive
abolition of a common law rule. The dissenting opinion violates the
principle of legality by allowing a court to retroactively abrogate a
common law rule not based on precedent, but rather on "finding" the
law. In the context of statutory interpretation, the majority opinion
seems to undermine Bouie's prohibition of unforeseeable retroactive
264. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d at 508-09.
265. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
266. Part of the Nebraska Supreme Court's reasoning was that Nebraska's criminal
code had abolished common law crimes. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d at 506. Thus, the court
was not engaged in "common law judging." See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 460.
267. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461-62.
268. See State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 399-400 (Tenn. 1999), affd, 532 U.S. 451
(2001); Transcript of Oral Argument, Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001) (No. 99-
6218), available at 2000 WL 1677740, at *16-18, *25-29 (Nov. 1, 2000).
269. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Rogers (No. 99-6218), available at 2000 WL
167740, at *16-18, *25-29.
270. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 467.
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statutory interpretation, but because the decision is couched in terms
of "common law decisionmaking," it is unclear how Rogers's
limitation of Bouie will be applied by the judiciary. If Redmond is
any indication of this application, protections for defendants will
decrease. The dissenting opinion violates the principle of legality by
allowing a court to retroactively hold that a prior line of decisions was
wrong, allowing courts to change the law under the guise of correcting
their own mistakes.
CONCLUSION
Judges are often in a nearly impossible predicament.27' If they
identify an outdated common law or an incorrect interpretation of a
statute and abolish it retroactively, then they will violate the principle
of legality.272  If they overrule the law or the interpretation
prospectively, then they are acting more like legislatures than courts
and their revisions to the law are arguably dicta.273 This Comment
focuses on the former concern274 and argues that courts should apply
the principle of legality and fundamental fairness to their decisions.
By applying these principles, courts will protect criminal defendants
from both retroactive changes in the law and harsh, unjust decisions.
In the context of the common law, courts should not retroactively
abolish common law rules that protect defendants.27 But if an
obsolete common law rule disadvantages a defendant, the court
should, in the interest of fundamental fairness, abrogate the rule and
apply the abrogation retroactively. 6  The rules for statutory
271. See generally Timothy A. Baughman, Justice Moody's Lament Unanswered:
Michigan's Unprincipled Retroactivity Jurisprudence, 79 MICH. B. J. 664 (2000) (discussing
Michigan's need for a more coherent retroactivity jurisprudence).
272. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Rogers (No. 99-6218), available at 2000 WL
167740, at *9-11 (discussing the difficulties presented by not overruling at all, overruling
incrementally, or overruling prospectively).
273. See id.; Baughman, supra note 271, at 666; supra note 271 and accompanying text.
274. The scholarly literature is replete with analysis of prospective versus retroactive
judicial decision-making and its implications on separation of powers concerns and due
process. See, e.g., Baughman, supra note 271 (discussing Michigan's need for a more
coherent retroactivity jurisprudence); Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the
Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965) (analyzing
the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is
a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075
(1999) (examining the complexities of judicial retroactivity and proposing a framework for
handling retroactivity issues). The purpose of this Comment is to sketch some broad
propositions that courts should follow to uphold the principle of legality, not to propose a
new jurisprudence that addresses all of the complex issues in this area.
275. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
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construction should be analogous. In certain situations, a court may
determine that its prior decisions have incorrectly interpreted a
statute. In these cases, it should only change its interpretation
retroactively in situations in which the change will not disadvantage
the defendant. 277 Applying these basic principles to Redmond would
have yielded a more just outcome.
Rogers improperly construed Bouie and undermined the
principles of legality and due process by allowing the retroactive
overruling of a substantive rule of common law. Although Rogers
deserves no sympathy for his actions, the citizens of the United States
deserve more constraints on our judges. Rogers was an assault on the
principles of legality and due process, principles which protect the
innocent as well as the guilty.
HEYWARD D. ARMSTRONG
276. As the Tennessee Supreme Court itself said, " 'Where the reason fails the rule
should not apply.' " State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 401 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Brown v.
Selby, 332 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1960)), affd, 532 U.S. 451 (2001). The Tennessee
Supreme Court erred, however, in interpreting this rule to disadvantage the defendant.
To protect an interest in fundamental justice, this rule should only work to protect
criminal defendants.
277. To do otherwise would violate Bouie's prohibition of "unexpected and
indefensible" constructions. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) (internal
quotations omitted).
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